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In case this sounds cryptic let me try and explain. The mind is not, in my view, consciousness or awareness, but organized experience. The body is not a peculiarly complex arrangement of molecules, but an instrument for the carrying into effect of an organized, circumscribed, range of coordinated actions. The interaction of mind and body is not seen therefore by comparing, say, my state when I am at work in my study when my body is apparently quiescent, and my state when I am climbing a mountain when my mind is apparently idle. The nature of the interaction is seen rather in the contrast between the waking state when tension is concentrated and the sleeping or dream state when tension is relaxed.

It is easy to say that this does not carry us far. I admit it. It does, however, point a direction. It shows the utter uselessness of trying to conceive the mind as the product of some material substance, say carbon, or as the function of some particular degree of complexity of a mechanical physical structure, say protoplasm.

It has always seemed to me that it was by a kind of philosophical instinct that the great metaphysicians of the seventeenth century were led to concentrate on the mind-body problem. Not only may we say that the whole mystery of existence lies concealed there, but also it is the point in our experience where we are continually brought face to face with the problem of philosophy in its most intimate form. There is little doubt, we feel, that if this relation could be made clear to our intellectual apprehension, the greater problem of nature and spirit would dissolve.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Justification of the Good: an Essay on Moral Philosophy.

VLADIMIR SOLOVYOV. New York: the Macmillan Company. 1918. Pp. lxiii + 475.

It is hard either to characterize or to criticize this remarkable book. Its concepts belong to the philosophic tradition of western Europe; Kant and Schopenhauer and Hegel figure in its pages; Christian theology underlies its principles; evolutionary science furnishes its facts; and yet, in spite of these familiar traits, the work as a whole makes an impression of uniqueness and novelty and refuses to submit to our ordinary schemes of classification. And this strangeness is not merely a matter of its Russian form, for the translator, with the exception of a few phrases, has done her work well, and the book

reads like an original; it is the thought itself that makes the impression, or perhaps, rather the spirit of the man back of it vitalizing forms of thought themselves not new.

To call this spirit Christian and the thought a Christian philosophy may seem to suggest a too simple explanation of the effect. Christian philosophies we may seem to have had in too great numbers to permit of the ascription of a striking distinctiveness by the use of a title so familiar and so general. Perhaps the addition of the adjectives genuine and sane, in spite of the obvious subjectivism of them, may lend greater definiteness to the characterization. By the former one may distinguish this Russian philosophy from the denaturalized Christianity of Anglo-German Idealism, and by the latter from the robust interpretations of Russian primitiveness and anarchism. For this is not a philosophy adapted and perverted to meet the demands of a nominal Christian tradition, it is a philosophy which is the natural and extremely subtle expression of a profound religious experience. Genuine piety and vigorous faith breathe through every line of the book and nowhere, no matter how different our own experience may be, do we get a suggestion of the keen intellectual juggler or the superficial exponent of social Christianity. It is the philosophy of a man who has lived the experience he interprets and who has not blinked at the difficulties it involves, difficulties not to be solved dialectically, but only by life itself.

But while we are constantly carried back upon individual experience, the individual is not regarded as complete in himself. Tolstoi's negative interpretation of religion finds no sympathy in Solovyof, who insists upon the necessity of the historic process for the development of the individual and the unfolding of the meaning of life. It is in his emphasis on this historic development that the author's debt to Hegel is most clearly evident, but in the analysis itself he maintains an independent position.

The meaning of life is to be found only in the struggle to realize the perfect good, the aim of which is the enjoyment of perfection, or communion with God. That this is the real function of man is evidenced in the three fundamental attitudes which form the primary data of morality. Our relation to the lower world of nature is shown in our sense of shame at the essential processes of reproduction, a sense which admits of no utilitarian explanation and testifies to our distinctness from the merely animal. This sense of sexual shame with its corresponding virtue of continence is for him the root principle of morality and his keen analysis of it forms one of the most interesting parts of the book. Our relations to our fellows is one of likeness, expressing itself in pity or sympathy, indicating an essential unity

with them and necessary respect for them as for ourselves. Our relation to that which is above us is felt as reverence for the actualized Good or God. That there is such a being is not a matter of reasoning but of immediate experience, just as our recognition of our fellows is beyond or above proof. We can not doubt the existence of those whom we pity, nor of him whom we reverence. That there are those who feel no reverence and know no superior is irrelevant to the question: the existence of atheists is justified by the need for those too busy with this world to cultivate the sense for the unseen.

The realistic temper of Solovyof's thought finds expression in the fact that this good, which forms the goal of human endeavor, is not merely a principle of an eternal striving, but an end to be enjoyed by those who strive. This is of the essence of Christianity, it is a promise of victory. Rarely in philosophical literature has there been a more realistic and direct recognition of the insistent demand of the living for life. This is the condemnation of the esthetic attitude toward life, of the individualistic ideal of the superman, beauty and strength cease to be such in the presence of all-conquering death. No solution of the problem of life is really a solution that ends in death. No good that is not a victorious good is really a good. History, from the Christian point of view, is not a meaningless process of the birth and death of individuals, in which the good gleams and is gone, but is a process of universal redemption in which individuals as individuals share, a cumulative process by which death is overcome.

There is implied here a doctrine of universals which is not elaborated, but there is an interesting and unusual working out of the idea of family, racial and human solidarity that corrects the suggestion of asceticism involved in his emphasis on shame. The spiritualization of life takes place under the natural forms of the tribe, the nation and the race: and the tribal process involves the three-fold attitudes of the cult of the ancestors, the marriage of the contemporaries and the education of the children. This ancestor cult in Christianity involves the mutual cherishing of dead and living as all bound up together in the task of realizing the common good. The moral struggle of the living gains significance from this fact that it is an essential means through which the dead may also be brought to completeness of being through the final redemption of the world, and these latter in turn form an effective spiritual environment for the living. The unity of the family shows itself in the present through marriage in which natural desire gives place to spiritual love and the animal process of reproduction becomes a means for the embodiment of the image of God in man. It is because this union of man and woman is not yet perfect that external physical reproduction is

both the result and purpose in order that the children may bring to perfection that which the parents have failed to accomplish. Hence, as family religion constitutes the moral bond with the past and marriage forms the spiritual unity of the present, so education must fit the children for the moral task of the future.

If we ask for the ground upon which this whole system rests we find it in moral experience, in the facts of the moral life and their implications. To quote from the preface to the second edition: "The object of this book is to show the good as truth and righteousness, that is, as the only right and consistent way of life in all things and to the end, for all who decide to follow it. I mean the Good as such; it alone justifies itself and justifies our confidence in it." But, as the author indicates, such a justification of the Good will have significance only for him who has consciously chosen it, to others it will be not only useless but annoying. Although rejecting the subjective idealism of Kant, which he finds to infect also his ethics, his own position as a moralist seems nearer that of the categorical imperative than any other. The primacy of duty, the sharpness of the distinction between the ways of life and death, the inwardness of the moral life, all suggest Kant in spite of the fact that abstract rationalism has given place to frank mysticism with its immediate vision of the perfect Good.

But the question of classification is not very important in the case of a book such as this. Its value is in its genuineness and in its wealth of keenly analyzed experience, an experience in many respects remote from that of Western Christendom. It is stimulating and refreshing to come in contact with an attitude that is robust without being naturalistic, and idealistic without being anemic.

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Experiments in Psychical Science: Levitation, Contact, and the Direct Voice. W. J. CRAWFORD, D.Sc. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1919. Pp. xii + 201.

In this book the author deals in greater detail with "problems connected with the physical phenomena of spiritualism" which he formerly examined in his book, *The Reality of Psychic Phenomena*, published two years earlier. The author recognizes the existence of both conscious and unconscious fraud at séances for physical phenomena, but is confident that they are much overrated: "Sometimes the medium's body, or portions of her body, make spasmodic kinds of movements when heavy raps or impacts are being experienced out in the circle. These are simply reactions. . . . The seeker after fraud immediately puts them down to imposture. My experiments,